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SUMMARY OF THE REPLY 
This Court should affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor 
of McPhie. The record before this Court shows that the material facts are undisputed. 
These facts reveal that Dipoma delivered her complaint right before the statute of 
limitations ran. When Dipoma delivered her complaint she gave the court clerk a bad 
check. Even though she was contacted by the court clerk regarding the unpaid filing fee, 
Dipoma chose to wait nearly ten months before she paid the mandatory fee with good and 
proper funds. In fact, Dipoma waited so long to pay the proper fees that the trial court 
and the court clerk's office thought that Dipoma had abandoned her claim. 
Ten months later, Dipoma apparently decided to pursue her claim against 
McPhie. Dipoma hired an attorney, paid the required filing fee and served a copy of the 
complaint on McPhie. However, Dipoma had waited nearly ten months after the statute 
of limitations to do so. Because Dipoma had waited so long to pursue her claims and to 
pay the mandatory filing fees, the trial court dismissed her claim. 
Under express Utah law, the trial court's ruling was correct. The Utah 
legislature has stated in three separate statutes that, in order to commence a civil action, a 
plaintiff must pay the required filing fee before her complaint is considered "filed." See 
U.C.A. § 21-1-1, 21-1-5, 21-7-2. This practice is universally accepted in Utah's trial 
courts. 
Given that Dipoma attempted to pay the filing fee with a bad check, and given 
that Dipoma waited nearly ten months to pay the filing fee with good and proper funds, it 
is clear that the trial court properly dismissed Dipoma's claim. Every court that has 
vi 
considered this issue has found that, where a plaintiff waits an extended amount of time 
to pay the required filing fee, such conduct is unreasonable as a matter of law. 
In this appeal, Dipoma advocates a change in well accepted and practiced Utah 
law. Dipoma asks this Court to uphold the Court of Appeal's ruling that completely does 
away with the requirement that a civil litigant pay a filing fee in order to commence a 
civil action. The court held that "Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only 
requires a plaintiff to file a complaint in order to commence an action . . .." Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 1 P.3d 564, 569 (Ut. Ct. App 2000). In order to make such a ruling, the court 
was required to interpret three statutes that expressly require payment of filing fees in 
advance. See U.C.A. §§ 21-1-1, 21-1-5, 21-7-2. Rather than reading these statutes in 
harmony with Rule 3, the court rendered the statutes meaningless by holding that they 
were "merely directive." 
Dipoma claims that this Court should read Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in legal isolation from the rest of Utah law. Dipoma claims it was proper for 
the court of appeals to interpret three unambiguous statutes requiring the payment of 
filing fees as "merely directive." Dipoma claims it is proper to pay filing fees with a bad 
check. Dipoma claims it is reasonable for a civil litigant to wait as much as ten months 
before paying the fees required under Utah law. Dipoma's position is dismissive of the 
intent of the Utah Legislature as clearly expressed in three separate statutes. Dipoma's 
position is also dismissive of well accepted practice in Utah courts. Because Dipoma's 
position lacks merit under Utah law, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of McPhie. 
vii 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW A COMPLAINT IS NOT "FILED" 
UNTIL THE PROPER FILING FEE HAS BEEN PAID. 
McPhie has argued to this Court that, pursuant to Utah law, a plaintiff has not 
properly filed a complaint or commenced an action until she has payed the mandatory 
filing fee. McPhie has noted that, while Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
silent as to filing fees, the Utah Code requires that civil court clerks collect filing fees "in 
advance." U.C.A. § 21-1-1. Three separate statutes specifically address this issue. See 
U.C.A. §§ 21-1-1, 21-1-5, 21-7-2. These statutes are in unanimous agreement that a 
filing fee must be paid before a civil litigant may avail herself of the services of court.1 
Dipoma asks this Court to carve out a legal exception for her in a way that 
would allow her to side-step the filing fees required under Utah law and extend the statute 
of limitations by an additional ten months. Dipoma argues that, because Rule 3 does not 
expressly include the requirement that a filing fee be collected in advance of filing, Utah 
law therefore imposes no such requirement on civil litigants. Just as Dipoma would have 
this Court consider the specific facts of her case in a vacuum, she would have the Court 
consider Rule 3 in legal isolation. Dipoma would also have this Court ignore the 
accepted practice of Utah trial courts. 
Dipoma's position is dismissive of three statutes that are specifically directed 
to civil court clerks and mandatory filing fees. Section 21-1-1 of the Utah Code provides: 
1
 The Utah Legislature's decision to repeatedly comment on the requirements 
that filing fees be paid in advance emphasizes the importance of such fees to the 
functioning of the courts and of State government. 
1 
Collection in advance by state officers. 
For Services performed in their respective offices, the officers named 
in this chapter shall collect in advance for the use and benefit of the 
state the fees hereinafter enumerated and such other fees as may be 
provided by law. 
U.C.A. § 21-1-1 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Section 21-7-2 of the Utah Code is equally clear. This section, which also 
expressly applies to court clerks, provides: 
Payment of fees prerequisite to service — Exception. 
(l)(a) The state and county officers mentioned in this title may not 
perform any official service unless the fees prescribed for that 
service are paid in advance. 
U.C.A. § 21-7-2 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Finally, section 21-1-5 indicates that the filing fee for any civil complaint 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court of record is $120.00. Subsection (cc) to this statute 
expressly mandates that "all fees shall be paid at the time the clerk accepts the 
pleading for filing or performs the requested service." Utah Code Ann. § 21-1-5 (cc) 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
Dipoma's response to McPhie's opening brief steers clear of all three of these 
statutes. Dipoma's avoidance of these statutes is, of course, based on the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of these statutes as "merely directive." Dipoma's position serves 
as an explicit example of the types of arguments that will be advanced if the Court of 
Appeals' decision below is allowed to stand. 
Dipoma cites Avco Financial Services v. Caldwell 547 P.2d 756, 760 (Kan. 
1976) for the proposition that, in Kansas, filing fees do not have to be paid before a 
2 
complaint is considered "filed." However, Avco dealt with appellate jurisdiction of a 
district court over an appeal taken from a magistrate court where the appealing party had 
failed to pay a docket fee in small claims court. The Avco decision turned on the 
interpretation of Kansas Statute 61-2102 entitled The Code of Civil Procedure before 
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. See id. at 758. Moreover, Kansas does not employ the 
statutory framework set forth by the Utah Legislature in Sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-
7-2. As such, Dipoma's reliance on Avco is misguided as it does not apply to this case. 
Dipoma relies heavily on Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. 
DiAntonio. 618 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Commw. 1992) (hereinafter "SEPTA").2 Dipoma claims 
this case rejects the notion that a filing fee must be paid before an action is properly 
commenced. Dipoma misinterprets and misapplies this case. SEPTA involved a plaintiff 
who filed a personal injury complaint after allegedly being injured in a bus accident 
involving a SEPTA bus. The plaintiffs complaint went unanswered until the plaintiff 
notified SEPTA that she would file a default judgment. When it finally filed its answer 
with the court, SEPTA delivered the answer with a series of pleadings involving a 
number of cases. SEPTA was required by Pennsylvania law to file a docketing fee with 
its answer. SEPTA paid the docketing fees for the entire series of pleadings with a single 
check that was later determined to be written for an incorrect amount. Without 
explanation, the court clerk determined that only the filing fee for the answer was 
2
 Dipoma incorrectly cites SEPTA as if it were a Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
case. In reality, SEPTA's appeal was heard by the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania, a court that hears appeals from Common Pleas Courts from various 
Pennsylvania counties. See id. at 1182. 
3 
deficient and entered a default judgment against SEPTA. The court clerk did not notify 
SEPTA of the incorrect filing fee until after the default judgment had been entered. 
SEPTA then filed an appeal with the commonwealth court claiming that the 
trial court should have opened its default judgment on the grounds that SEPTA had not 
been informed of the docketing fee deficiency until after the judgment had been entered. 
The court specifically noted that it was not considering the issue of whether SEPTA's 
answer had been timely filed as the issue had been intentionally waived by both parties. 
See id. at 1185 n. 4. The court decided that, because SEPTA had not been informed of 
the docket fee deficiency until after default judgment had been entered, and because 
SEPTA had a meritorious defense, the default judgment should be opened. See id. at 
1185. 
For a number of reasons, SEPTA is clearly not this case. First, SEPTA 
involved the filing of an answer and the payment of fees required to accompany an 
answer under Pennsylvania law. As such, SEPTA did not involve commencement of an 
action as provided for under Rule 3. Second, the SEPTA court specifically noted that it 
was not deciding the issue of whether Pennsylvania law required a litigant to pay a 
docketing fee before a pleading was considered filed. Third, SEPTA did not involve the 
statutory framework adopted by the Utah Legislature in Sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-
2 or the application of Pennsylvania's version of Rule 3. Fourth, unlike Dipoma, SEPTA 
was not notified of the insufficient amount of its check until after entry of judgment. 
Dipoma on the other hand was notified by the court clerk on more than one occasion that 
she had not properly paid the filing fee. Dipoma then chose to ignore her bad check and 
4 
waited nearly ten months before she paid the proper fee. Lastly, SEPTA involved the 
application of default judgments which, under Pennsylvania law, are opened where there 
exists a "reasonable excuse" for failure to respond. See SEPTA, at 1183. The instant 
case, on the other hand, involves the application of the statute of limitations which is 
applied with an entirely different standard, and for which excuses for failure to comply 
are not entertained.3 See Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 219 (Utah 
2000). 
Dipoma disagrees with the Colorado Court of Appeal's decision in Broker 
House International v. Bendelow. 952 P.2d 860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), and claims that 
People v. Davenport, 998 P.2d 473 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) narrows the Broker House 
decision. McPhie submits that Dipoma reads the Davenport decision too generously and 
in a way that was not intended by the Colorado Court of Appeals. 
Similar to SEPTA, Davenport involved a default judgment against a criminal 
defendant under the Colorado Contraband Forfeiture Act. After being notified of the 
potential default judgment, the defendant's counsel filed a response, but failed to pay the 
fee required by the Forfeiture Act. As such, the trial court ordered the response stricken. 
On appeal, the court noted that it was dealing with a default judgment and 
stated that "[ejntry of default judgment is the harshest of all sanctions, and it should be 
3
 Dipoma also relies on Foley v. Foley, 147 CaLApp.2d 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1956). This case is discussed in more detail below. However, it should be noted at this 
point that, like SEPTA, Foley did not involve the commencement of an action. Instead, 
Foley involved a motion for new trial filed in a divorce case. Such a situation does not 
involve the principles embodied in Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These 
principles were not discussed by the Foley court. 
5 
used only in extreme circumstances." Id at 475. After examining the facts leading up to 
the defendant's failure to pay the required docketing fee, the court concluded that "[t]he 
inadvertent failure to pay a docket fee at the time of filing, without any other aggravating 
factor, does not constitute an extreme circumstance. Therefore, we hold that striking the 
defendant's response and entering a default judgment in the circumstances here was an 
abuse of discretion." Id, (emphasis added). 
The court recognized that some litigants might be inclined to read its decision 
in Davenport in a way that conflicted with or narrowed Broker House. As such the court 
took the opportunity to explain the difference between the two cases. The court stated 
that: 
To the extent that Broker House International Ltd. v. Bendelow, 
952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998), might be interpreted to reach a 
contrary conclusion, we find it distinguishable from this case. In 
Broker House, the plaintiffs failure to perfect the commencement 
of the action impacted the defendant's right to rely on the statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 475 (emphasis added). 
Dipoma claims that this statement is an attempt to narrow the Broker House 
decision. (See Brief of Respondent, p. 20.) McPhie submits that this statement in 
Davenport is a recognition that default judgments, which are imposed at the discretion of 
the court, and statutes of limitations, which are not discretionary, are imposed under 
entirely different standards that require differing results. The court's statement merely 
recognizes that, while courts try to avoid seemingly harsh results when default judgments 
are concerned, the courts often intentionally impose such results where statutes of 
6 
limitations are concerned. Utah courts have often discussed and applied this principle. 
See, e.g., Vigos, 993 P.2dat219; Fields v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
754 P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As such, this statement in Davenport is an 
admonition to future litigants to not read the Davenport and Broker House decisions as 
narrowing each other, but as dealing with different legal standards. 
By reading the Davenport decision too generously, Dipoma has read over the 
court's admonition. Broker House continues to be accepted law in Colorado where a 
mandatory filing fee and a statute of limitations is involved.4 More importantly, unlike 
the cases cited by Dipoma, and unlike the appellate rule decisions relied on by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Broker House is directly on point to the issue now before this Court.5 
Broker House and Davenport clearly stand for the principle that where a civil litigant fails 
to pay mandatory filing fees, her complaint is not properly filed for purposes of Rule 3. 
The Broker House and Davenport decisions are supported by those courts that 
have considered this specific issue in the context of filing fees, Rule 3 and statutes of 
limitations. See Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 713 F.Supp. 533, 538 (N.D.N.Y 
1989) aff d., 108 F.3d 462, 465 (2nd Cir. 1997) (finding that, under the federal rules, 
4
 Broker House has also been cited by the Colorado Supreme Court as 
continuing to be accepted law. See Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C., 990 
P.2d 78 (Colo 1999). Though Bebo involved a different issue, the court's citation to 
Broker House is indicative of its continuing acceptance. 
5
 The Utah Court of Appeals noted the factual similarities between the instant 
case and Broker House and also pointed out that both Utah and Colorado have similar 
rule and statutory constructs. The court stated "[s]imilar to Utah, Colorado's rules of civil 
procedure are modeled after the federal rules, and Colorado has a statute which requires 
payment of fees at the time a complaint is filed." Dipoma, at 566. 
7 
failure to pay filing fee is jurisdictional); Keith v. Heckler, 603 F.Supp. 150, 156-57 (E.D. 
Va. 1985) (same); De-Gas. Inc. v. Midland Resources. 470 So.2d 1218, 1222 (Ala. 1985) 
(finding that, under the Alabama rules of civil procedure, failure to pay filing fee is 
jurisdictional); Boostrom v. Back 622 N.E.2d 175, 176-77 (Ind. 1993) (finding that, 
under the Indiana rules of civil procedure, failure to pay filing fee is jurisdictional). 
Despite these cases, the Utah Court of Appeals went on to discuss and cite two 
Kansas cases that have held that Rule 3 does not require the payment of filing fees. 
However, important distinctions exist between the cases discussed above and the Kansas 
cases. In Burnett v. Perry Mfg., Inc., 151 F.R.D. 398, 402 (D. Kan. 1993),6 the plaintiff 
originally commenced an action resulting from injuries sustained on January 3, 1989. 
The action was dismissed voluntarily without prejudice on September 17, 1992. On 
March 17, 1992, the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
received a complaint unaccompanied by a filing fee. However, an application to proceed 
in forma pauperis did accompany the complaint. The application was denied on March 
30, 1992. On July 28, 1992, the court advised the plaintiff that the clerk was unable to 
accept the complaint for filing due to the absence of the proper fee. Subsequently, on 
6
 It is interesting to note that, later in its opinion, the Dipoma majority 
criticized Judge Bench's citation to several federal cases on the issue of the 
reasonableness of Dipoma's conduct. The Dipoma majority claimed that "these federal 
cases all turn on the interplay of provisions of federal law and practice, including Title 
VIFs ninety-day period within which to sue after getting an EEOC right-to-sue letter . . 
.." Dipoma, at 570 n. 4. Ironically these same cases were cited by the majority to support 
its conclusion that Utah law does not require a civil litigant to pay filing fees. See 
Dipoma, at 567 (citing Burnett v. Perry Mfg.. Inc., 151 F.R.D. 398 (D. Kan. 1993); Jarrett 
v. US Sprint Communications Co.. 22 F.3d 256 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
8 
August 7, 1992, plaintiff paid the filing fee. 
The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the 
plaintiff had failed to file his second complaint within six months of the voluntary 
dismissal as provided under the Kansas saving statute. The defendant claimed that, 
because the plaintiff had failed to pay the fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 before the six 
month time limit expired, the complaint was barred. Thus the court was required to 
determine whether section 1914 was jurisdictional. 
The court focused on a provision of the statute that allowed local district 
courts to determine for themselves whether they would require pre-payment of filing fees 
before accepting jurisdiction. Noting that neither Kansas, nor the federal district court 
had chosen to implement such a local rule, the court held that the pre-payment of the 
filing fee was not jurisdictional. The court reasoned as follows: 
When read with 28 U.S.C. § 1914(c), in which Congress allows 
each district court to require by rule advance payment of fees, it 
seems clear that Congress did not intend by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to 
require parties to pre-pay the fee. Instead, Congress grants each 
district the discretion to decide whether it will require parties to 
pre-pay the fee. Unlike some districts, the local rules for the 
District of Kansas do not contain a provision requiring the parties 
to pay the filing fee in advance. Thus, the District of Kansas did not 
explicitly exercise the authority to require pre-payment granted in 
28 U.S.C. § 1914(c). 
14 at 402. 
As such, the outcome in Burnett turned on the fact that the jurisdiction had 
chosen not to adopt a local rule as provided in the statute. Burnett is substantially 
distinguishable from the case now before this Court. Unlike the rule-making bodies in 
9 
Burnett, the Utah Legislature has chosen to require, in three separate unambiguous 
statutes, that court clerks collect filing fees before a plaintiff can properly file a 
complaint. These statutes, read consistently with Rule 3, mandate the well-accepted 
principle and practice that, in order to commence a cause of action in Utah, a plaintiff 
must first pay a filing fee. Because the Utah Legislature has specifically adopted the 
statutory construct missing from Burnett, Burnett is not applicable to this case. 
Burnett is also distinguishable as it involved a plaintiff who had filed an 
application to proceed in forma pauperis that is not at issue in this case. In Utah, the 
limitations and standards applicable to in forma pauperis plaintiffs are set forth in rules 
and statutes that are not applicable here. Furthermore, Burnett relied on Avco Financial 
Services , 547 P.2d at 760. As discussed above, Avco involved different procedural rules 
arising from an appeal from a magistrate court. As noted in Burnett and Avco, neither 
Kansas nor the Federal District Court for the District of Kansas employed a statutory or 
rule construct like those used in Colorado and Utah.7 
Unlike the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals below, this case presents 
this Court with a set of express statutory rules that specifically apply to trial court clerks. 
In light of the principles discussed in Broker House, Wanamaker, Keith, De-Gas and 
7
 The Utah Court of Appeals also cited Jarrett v. US Sprint Communications 
Co., 22 F.3d 256, 258-59 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Kansas law) for the proposition that 
district court authority could be found that supported both sides of the debate regarding 
prepayment of filing fees. This case involved a plaintiff who failed to pay the proper 
filing fee prior to expiration of the ninety day time limit provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(f)(l) where a right-to-sue letter is received from the EEOC. Not only did Jarrett 
not involve a statute of limitations, it did not involve rule or statutory provisions similar 
to those at issue in this case. This case is discussed in more detail below. 
10 
Boostromu it is difficult to understand how both Dipoma and the Court of Appeals can 
completely disregard the intent of the Utah Legislature as clearly expressed in these 
statutes. There is no indication within these statutes that would signal that they are to be 
applied as "merely directive" such that civil litigants do not have to pay filing fees to 
commence a civil lawsuit. The net result of the Court of Appeals' approach towards these 
statutes is that it judicially renders the Legislature's expressed intent null and void. 
McPhie submits that the legally appropriate way to apply Rule 3 is to avoid 
legally isolating the Rule by applying it in a manner consistent with Utah law. Until the 
Court of Appeals' decision, the requirement that a civil litigant must pay filing fees prior 
to commencing her action was well accepted practice in Utah trial courts. The Court of 
Appeals' decision that holds "Rule 3 . . . only requires a plaintiff to file a complaint in 
order to commence an action," changes this practice. Where this practice is expressly set 
forth in a number of Utah statutes, McPhie submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied 
Rule 3 and misinterpreted the intent of the Utah Legislature as expressed in the statues 
discussed above. 
II. UNDER ACCEPTED RULES OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
FOUND THAT UTAH LAW REQUIRES A FILING FEE TO 
BE PAID BEFORE A COMPLAINT IS PROPERLY 
"FILED." 
The legal isolationism advocated by Dipoma directly violates the principles of 
statutory interpretation often discussed by this Court. McPhie has argued that the Court 
of Appeals' decision violates accepted rules of statutory interpretation in two ways. First, 
Utah law requires that rules and statutes be read in harmony with existing Utah law. By 
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holding that "Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only requires a plaintiff to file a 
complaint in order to commence an action .. ." the Court of Appeals has read Rule 3 in 
isolation from other Utah law that specifically applies to the exact same issue as Rule 3. 
The Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 3 and sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-
2 in a manner that placed the Rule in conflict with the statutes. In order to resolve this 
false conflict, the Court of Appeals was required to insert the caveat that the statutes were 
"merely directive." The Court of Appeals applied this interpretation to the statutes 
without any signal from the Legislature or any Utah court that the statues were directive, 
and without explaining how they reached such a conclusion. The reading of Rule 3 in a 
manner that requires the disabling of three Utah statutes is not in keeping with the rules of 
statutory interpretation often enunciated by this Court. 
Second, by interpreting sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2 as "merely 
directive," the Court of Appeals stole all legal meaning and effect from three 
unambiguous statutes. As this Court has often held, McPhie argues that the construction 
of a statute such that it ceases to have any meaningful or practical application to the 
subject matter it was intended to govern is not in keeping with Utah law. See, e.g., Lyon 
v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 623 (Utah 2000). 
Dipoma fails to address these rules of statutory interpretation as applied to this 
case in any manner. Instead, Dipoma recites another rule of statutory interpretation: that 
when two statutes are in conflict, the more specific provision will apply. (See Brief of 
Respondent, p. 24.) Dipoma's position, however, ignores the more fundamental question 
of whether Rule 3 and sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2 are really conflicting provisions 
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of law. Given this Court's admonition that rules and statutes are to be read in harmony, it 
is clear that Dipoma's position relies on the false conflict created by the Court of 
Appeals' reading of the statutes, so that she can advocate the unnecessary solution of 
interpreting the statutes as "merely directive." See Lyon, 5 P.3d at 622; .see Roberts v. 
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). 
As the plain language of Rule 3 and the statutes shows, there is nothing to 
indicate that these provisions are at all in conflict. A harmonious reading of these 
provisions results in the requirement that a plaintiff must pay the filing fee before her 
complaint is considered "filed." This rule is well accepted in Utah law and practice. 
Dipoma recites the Court of Appeals' analogy to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure that took up the majority of the court's opinion. However, it must be noted 
that there is a distinct difference between those appellate rules relied on by Dipoma and 
the Court of Appeals and the rule and statutes that are at issue here. As stated by the 
Court of Appeals, the appellate rule cases cited in the Dipoma decision are not controlling 
on the issues now before this Court. 
The Court of Appeals' discussion centered around three rules of appellate 
procedure: former Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as Rules 3 
and 14(b) of the current Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court noted that former Rule 
73 expressly states that payment of a docketing fee is jurisdictional. .See former Utah R. 
App. P. 73; Dipoma, 1 P.3d at 568; (R. 106). Similarly, Rule 14(b) expressly provides 
that the court clerk may not accept a petition unless the docketing fee has been paid. See 
Utah R. App. P. 14(b); Dipoma, 1 P.3d at 569; (R. 107-08). Rule 3, on the other hand, 
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expressly provides that failure to pay the docketing fee is not jurisdictional.8 jSee Utah R. 
App. P. 3; Dipoma, 1 P.3d at 568; (R. 106-07). 
The Court of Appeals then compared these appellate rules to Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil procedure. Because the appellate rules expressly discussed filing 
fees, the Court of Appeals concluded that, as Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
contains no specific reference to filing fees, and no specific incorporation of sections 21-
1-1,21-1-5 or 21-7-2, the filing fee need not be paid before a trial court takes jurisdiction 
over a case. See Dipoma, at 569; (R. 107-08). The court stated: 
Unlike Rule 14, Rule 3 contains no specific reference to filing fees 
as a jurisdictional necessity nor does it incorporate sections 21-1-1, 
21-1-5 or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code as jurisdictional requirements. 
The plain language of Rule 3 merely requires that a plaintiff "file" a 
complaint with the court clerk. Reference to filing fees as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to commencing an action is notably 
absent from Rule 3, and we decline to read it into the rule. Sections 
21-1-1,21-1-5, and 21-7-2 are merely directive to court clerks. 
Dipoma, at 568 (emphasis added). 
McPhie submits that the Court of Appeals conclusion is incorrect under this 
Court's principles of statutory interpretation. See Hausknect v. The Industrial 
Commission, 882 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Nothing in sections 21-1-1, 21-1-
5 and 21-7-2 indicates that the Utah Legislature intended these statutes to be "merely 
directive" such that a civil litigant does not have to pay filing fees to commence a civil 
action. Such a construction of this series of statutes disables the express provisions of the 
8
 This Court recently noted as such in Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 
410 Utah Adv. Rep. 39. 
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Utah Legislature in a way that reduces these sections to nothing more than mere 
suggestions. 
Dipoma claims that she has analyzed "the statutory history" of these statutes 
and has concluded that it supports her position. (See Brief of Respondent, p. 23.) 
Dipoma then claims that the Court of Appeals "essentially adopted the analysis of 
Dipoma in its opinion paragraphs 10-17." (Id.) It is not clear what Dipoma means by 
statutory history. A review of Dipoma's analysis discloses not a single comment on the 
legislative history of the three statutes that requires advance payment of mandatory filing 
fees. Similarly, a review of paragraphs 10-17 of the Court of Appeals' decision shows 
only a review of the history of the case, not a review of "statutory history." (See Brief of 
Respondent, p. 23; Brief of Respondent, Appendix, ^ 10-17.) In reality, neither Dipoma 
nor the Court of Appeals ever discussed the legislative history of these statutes.9 
When Rule 3 is read consistently with sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2, the 
rule of law becomes that which is well accepted in practice and principle in the Utah trial 
courts: that in order to commence a civil lawsuit, the plaintiff must pay the mandatory 
filing fee before the complaint is properly filed. 
III. UNDER UTAH LAW, DIPOMA'S PAYMENT OF THE 
MANDATORY FILING FEE WITH A BAD CHECK IS NOT 
A VALID OR LEGITIMATE PAYMENT. 
Dipoma claims that she did in fact pay the mandatory filing fee when she 
9
 Such an exercise by the Court of Appeals would first require a finding that 
the statutes were ambiguous. While the Court of Appeals did interpret the statutes in a 
way that conflicted with Rule 3, thereby requiring the "merely directive" holding, the 
Court of Appeals never found that the statutes were at all ambiguous. 
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tendered her bad check to the court clerk. Dipoma argues that, because she tendered a 
check, albeit an insufficient funds check, she uclearly paid the correct filing fee to the 
District Court clerk." (Brief of Respondent, p. 25.) Dipoma's position ignores the reality 
of her interaction with the trial court and Utah law regarding the issuance of bad checks. 
The reality of Dipoma's situation is that, while she tendered a check to the 
court clerk when she delivered her complaint, the clerk only accepted the check with the 
understanding that the check represented good and sufficient funds. Certainly, had the 
court clerk known that Dipoma's check was drawn on insufficient funds, the court clerk 
would have rejected the complaint. Dipoma essentially ignored the situation she created 
with her bad check for nearly ten months, thereby requiring the court clerk to assess 
additional fees and administratively track Dipoma's outstanding balance. McPhie 
submits that tendering a bad check to a court clerk and then waiting nearly ten months to 
pay the required funds, is entirely different than "properly paying a filing fee." 
Utah law clearly supports this position. The Utah Criminal Code provides that 
any person who willfully issues a check, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee, is 
guilty of issuing a bad check. See U.C.A. § 76-6-505(1) (1999). The Code further 
provides that any person who issues a check that is later refused by the drawee, is guilty 
of issuing a bad check "if he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the 
amount of the refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the 
check or draft nonpayment." U.C.A. § 76-6-505(2) (1999); see State v. Bartholomew, 
724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1986) (discussing effect of subsection 2). 
While it is not clear in the record whether Dipoma knew her check was bad at 
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the time she gave it to the clerk, it is abundantly clear that she failed to make good and 
actual payment to the clerk until nearly ten months after the check was written. Further, it 
is clear that Dipoma was notified by the court clerk that she had written a bad check, and 
that Dipoma chose to ignore this situation until many months later. As such, it is 
undisputed that Dipoma's refusal to make proper payment was not reasonable or proper 
payment under Utah law. Under the guidance provided by section 76-6-505(2) Dipoma's 
claim that her ten-month-late payment of the amount she owed the court was "proper 
payment," is disingenuous. Because Dipoma failed to make good and actual payment on 
her check for nearly ten months, Dipoma's payment of the mandatory filing fee with a 
bad check was not a proper or reasonable payment. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
OPINION IMPOSES UNREASONABLE BURDENS ON 
GOVERNMENT AND GIVES THE COURT CLERK 
DISCRETION WHERE NONE WAS INTENDED. 
In his opening brief, McPhie pointed out that the effect of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion below is not limited to the issue of bad checks and the commencement 
of a cause of action. McPhie submits that the Court of Appeals' opinion opens the door 
for numerous parties who avail themselves of government services to claim that fees and 
payments do not need to be made before service. When the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision held that sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2 were "merely directive," the court 
necessarily impacted a number of State offices expressly governed by these sections. 
These offices include: the Lieutenant Governor's Office; the Division of Corporations; 
the State Auditor's Office; and the civil courts. See U.C.A. § 21-1-1 -5 (1999). 
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' decision impacts not just the filing of a 
complaint in a civil trial court, but all filings of all fees in all civil courts. Just to name a 
few, these fees would include: divorce petition fees; small claims filing fees; appellate 
fees; probate filing fees; child custody filing fees; and arbitration fees. See U.C.A. § 21-
1-5 (1999) (listing over thirty categories of fees governed by this section). It is not hard 
to imagine that, in time, court clerks would spend more time tracking, accounting for and 
collecting fees than they would performing their other numerous court duties. 
Dipoma states that McPhie attempts to expand this case "to encompass an 
entire rainbow of unreal issues." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 14,22.) Dipoma's criticism is 
a colorful departure from her position in the Court of Appeals. There, Dipoma stated: 
As will be seen, what would normally be an insignificant 
event - the return of a $120 check, now becomes a major legal 
issue requiring analogy to numerous statutes and rules as well as to 
related Utah and other jurisdiction cases [sic]. 
Although the scope of this appeal involved the question 
of a returned check, the effect of this decision will affect numerous 
other factual variations. For example, some lawsuits may be 
commenced where a clerk erroneously fails to collect a fee or fails 
to collect the proper fee. . . . Thus, this decision will serve to 
answer a variety of simple questions which have tremendous 
consequences for some litigants. 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 10-11.) Just as Dipoma once recognized, McPhie submits that 
the facts of this case cannot be considered in a legal vacuum. 
Dipoma's new position aside, it is clear that the Court of Appeals' decision 
below can have a serious impact on those governmental entities, including trial courts and 
court clerks, that are subject to Sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5 and 21-7-2. By interpreting these 
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statutes as "merely directive," the Court of Appeals has essentially gutted the statutes of 
all legal meaning and binding authority. In fact, the Court of Appeals went further and 
held that Utah law "only requires a plaintiff to file a complaint in order to commence an 
action . . .." Dipoma, at 569. McPhie submits that, had the Utah Legislature intended 
these statutes to be "merely directive," the Legislature would have so indicated. 
As discussed in McPhie's opening brief, it is not hard to imagine the potential 
effect of the Court of Appeals' decision. A perfect example of the administrative 
hardships that Dipoma's position would work on the trial court and clerk courts can be 
found by looking at Dipoma's interaction with the trial court below. On December 29, 
1997, when Dipoma's check was returned to the court clerk's office for insufficient 
funds, the court was required to create a fee account to trace the unpaid filing fee as well 
as the $20 returned check fee. (R. 21). A number of entries are listed on the docket 
showing how the court clerks were required to track, account for, review and correspond 
with Dipoma regarding the amounts she owed to the court. (R. 21). It is no stretch to 
imagine the excessive burden that would be placed on the already overworked court 
systems in Utah as more and more civil litigants learned that the courts would loan them 
the money for a filing fee for which they would be later billed. Utah's trial courts should 
not be saddled with the burden of having to act as collection agencies to those who fail or 
refuse to pay filing fees. 
The Court of Appeals approach in reading sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2 
as "merely directive" to court clerks, places the court clerk, and the potential litigant on 
unequal footing. Such an approach requires different conduct of two parties to the same 
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transaction. Under Dipoma, a potential litigant could present her complaint and a copy of 
the Dipoma decision at the clerk's window and demand to file her complaint without 
paying the filing fee, as the statutes did not apply to her. At the same time, the court 
clerk, bound by the statutes, would have to refuse to accept the complaint. Under 
Dipoma, this scenario could easily be repeated in all thirty of the government departments 
listed in sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2. Such an inconsistent holding clearly does 
not accomplish the result intended by the Utah Legislature. 
V. DIPOMA'S EVENTUAL PAYMENT OF THE 
MANDATORY FILING FEE NEARLY TEN MONTHS 
AFTER IT WAS DUE IS UNREASONABLE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
Given that Dipoma waited nearly ten months to make proper payment of the 
required filing fee to the court clerk, it is clear that Dipoma's conduct is unreasonable as a 
matter of law. Knowing that her conduct is clearly unreasonable as a matter of law, 
Dipoma has chosen to address the technicalities rather than the substance of this 
argument. 
Dipoma claims that "[i]t goes without citation that a party who does not assert 
a claim waives it on appeal." (Respondent's Brief, p. 33.) Dipoma's position goes 
without citation because it is not in keeping with Utah law. The Utah Court of Appeals 
recognized this principle below when it stated that "[i]t is true, as the dissent suggests, 
that we may latch on to a new ground if, on that basis, it is possible to affirm the trial 
court." Dipoma, at 569. Thus, even the majority in Dipoma did not hold that McPhie had 
waived a reasonableness argument. 
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In his dissent below, Judge Bench discussed this issue in detail and quoted as 
follows: 
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree 
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not 
urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Dipoma, at 570 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 461 P.2d 290, 293 
(Utah 1969)). 
Judge Bench concluded: 
Thus, under controlling Utah law, an alternative ground for 
affirmance need not be raised in or considered by the trial court. 
Accordingly we must address the alternative ground for affirmance 
that appellee has presented on appeal. 
Id. As such, it is clear under Utah law that, the issue of whether Dipoma's decision to 
wait ten months before paying the filing fee was reasonable, is properly before this Court. 
Dipoma next argues that, even if this Court does consider the issue of 
reasonableness, it is not "apparent on the record" that Dipoma's conduct was 
unreasonable. Dipoma essentially argues that because reasonableness is a fact-based 
question, it cannot form the grounds for summary judgment. McPhie submits that this 
position substantially ignores the record of this case. 
It is true that, under Utah law, issues such as reasonableness are often 
questions of fact that are reserved for the finder of fact. However, it is equally well 
accepted that, where reasonable minds could come but to one conclusion, and where there 
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are no genuine issues of material fact, the issue presents a question of law.10 See, e.g., 
Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). In other words, if it is clear that no 
reasonable jury could find that Dipoma's decision to wait nearly ten months before 
making proper payment of the required filing fee was reasonable, the trial court's order of 
summary judgment must be affirmed. 
Judge Bench in the decision below, and every other court that has considered 
this concise issue, have held that, where a party waits an extended period of time to make 
proper payment of a mandatory filing fee, the party's conduct is unreasonable as a matter 
of law. Judge Bench reviewed the undisputed facts as they appear in the record as 
follows: 
[Dipoma] attempted to pay the filing fee by personal check when 
she filed her complaint on November 24, 1997. The check was 
returned to the court clerk for insufficient funds on December 29, 
1997. It is unclear from the record exactly when appellant received 
notice that her check had bounced. It may have been as early as 
December [1997]. but it was certainly no later than March 10, 
1998. This later date was when appellant attempted to pay the filing 
fee with a second check, but the court clerk insisted on another 
form of payment because the first check had bounced. In any event, 
appellant allowed an additional five months to elapse before she 
finally paid the filing fee on August 11, 1998. 
Dipoma, at 570. 
Judge Bench concluded by stating: 
In my opinion, waiting more than five months to pay the filing fee 
after being informed that a check has bounced is unreasonable, as a 
matter of law. 
10
 Before beginning its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he 
facts pertinent to the issues on appeal are undisputed." Dipoma, at 565. 
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IdL 
Every other court that either party or the Court of Appeals has located on this 
issue has held that, where a party waits an extended period of time to pay a mandatory 
filing fee, such conduct is unreasonable as a matter of law. See, e.g.. Breckin v. MBNA 
America, 28 F.Supp. 2d 209 (D. Del. 1998) (holding that waiting three months is 
unreasonable as a matter of law, and that failure to pay cannot be used to extend 
limitations periods); Truitt v. County of Wavne. 148 F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(waiting four months was unreasonable); Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ, 45 F.3d 161, 
165 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that waiting three months was unreasonable, and that courts 
do not grant indefinite extensions to pay filing fees); Jarrett v. US Sprint Communications 
Co., 22 F.3d 256, 259 (10th Cir. 1994) (waiting five months was unreasonable). 
Dipoma does not dispute the merit of these cases, but instead claims that they 
all relied upon factual records concerning the actions or inactions of the litigants. 
However, a detailed review of these cases shows that, in each case, the courts relied on no 
more facts than are available on the record before this Court. The single factor dictating 
the holding that each party's conduct was unreasonable, was the fact that the party had 
waited for such an extended period of time. 
McPhie submits that, even without the above cases, Utah law already provides 
guidelines as to the period of time that is considered reasonable. As discussed above, the 
Utah Criminal Code requires that a person who has paid any fee with a bad check has 
fourteen days after being notified of the deficiency in which to rectify the situation. In 
Utah, where a person fails to make good and proper payment within fourteen days after 
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notice, that person commits a crime. Surely, under Utah law, it cannot be considered 
reasonable to commit such a crime. 
Dipoma cites Foley v. Foley. 147 Cal.App.2d 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) for the 
proposition that this Court should not find that Dipoma's conduct was in violation of 
Utah law. This case is overwhelmingly distinguishable from the case before this Court. 
Foley involved a divorce action brought by a wife against her husband. The husband 
filed a cross-complaint against his wife alleging "extreme cruelty." After the husband 
was granted a judgment based on his cross-complaint, the wife filed a motion for a new 
trial. California law required that such a motion be filed within ten days of judgment and 
that it be accompanied by a fee. However, Mrs. Foley failed to pay the fee when she filed 
her motion, and instead paid it four days after the filing deadline. Because the motion had 
been filed within ten days, the trial court accepted the motion, even though the fee was 
late. 
The husband appealed, claiming that the court should not have accepted the 
motion. The appellate court rejected the husband's position and held that because the 
case involved the filing of a motion, rather than the commencement of an action, and 
because Mrs. Foley paid the proper amount with proper funds only four days later, that 
the husband had suffered no prejudice. 
Foley is different than this case in a number of respects. First, as the court 
noted, Foley involved the filing of a motion for a new trial, not the commencement of an 
action as is involved in the instant case. Second, when Mrs. Foley did pay the filing fee, 
she did so with a proper form of payment. Dipoma, on the other hand, paid with a bad 
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check that remained dishonored and unpaid for nearly ten months. Third, Mrs. Foley paid 
the required fee only four days after the applicable deadline. Dipoma, on the other hand, 
waited nearly 150 days longer than Mrs. Foley to pay the required filing fee to commence 
her action against McPhie. Lastly, Mr. Foley suffered no prejudice by the late payment of 
the docketing fee because he was provided notice of the motion. Dipoma, on the other 
hand, was able to extend the four year statute of limitations for an additional ten months. 
During this time, she never notified McPhie that she was bringing a claim against him. 
It is important to note that Dipoma never defends her conduct as reasonable. 
The undisputed facts before this Court, as established by the record, show that Dipoma 
waited nearly ten months before properly paying the mandatory filing fee. Because 
Dipoma waited such an extended period of time, and because such period of time had the 
effect of extending the statute of limitations, Dipoma's actions are unreasonable as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner-Defendant Brian McPhie 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 2001. 
./" ! 
/ / 
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'Paul M. Belnap 
Andrew D. Wright 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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